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Article 5

NOTES
LIQUOR LICENSE-PRIVILEGE OR PROPERTY?

Introduction-A Brief Historical Survey of Liquor Control.
To facilitate full understanding of the central problem of this note - that
is, what is and what should be, the nature of a liquor license - a brief historical
survey of liquor control is appropriate. Society has long recognized that to permit
the uncontrolled sale of alcoholic beverages is not in the best interests of its members. It is well known that certain evils will most probably follow if the manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicants is not subjected to control by the governmental authorities. Prior to the passage of the eighteenth amendment, alcoholic beverage control in the United States ran the gamut from total inaction to
direct intervention on the part of the political authorities. We learned from the
Prohibition experiment that a system of control was needed which would not only
promote temperance, but also foster observance of the law. The year 1933 saw the
repeal of the ill-starred eighteenth amendment. The system of alcoholic beverage
control which was subsequently adopted, and which exists today, may be generally
classified as a "licensing system" set up under various state and municipal administrative agencies. The control of the licensing function in some jurisdictions resides exclusively in the state. In other states the authority is shared by the state and
local authorities, and, in a few states, license issuance is the primary responsibility
of the local authorities.'
I.

II.

The Property-Privilege Dichotomy as Applied to Liquor Licenses.
When faced with a problem involving a liquor license, most courts start with the
premise that such a license is a governmental grant which authorizes the grantee to
engage in a business which would otherwise be unlawful. Thus, the license is not
"property," but rather only a personal "privilege." 2 This proposition is perhaps well
founded in the light of the language utilized by Mr. Justice Field in the early
Supreme Court decision in Crowley v. Christensen:3
The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business
-

to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent

right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a
privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States.

Despite an imposing body of authority, and the words of the Supreme Court to
1

For a more complete discussion of licensing see
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23-40 (1950).
2 See, Alabama: Southall v. Stricos Corp., 153 So. 2d 234 (Ala. 1963); Arizona: Hooper
v. Duncan, 95 Ariz. 305, 389 P.2d 706 (1964); Clark v. Tinnin, 81 Ariz. 259, 304 P.2d 947
(1956); Connecticut: Barnini v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 146 Conn. 416, 151 A.2d 697
(1959); Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Idaho: Nampa Lodge No.
1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P.2d 991 (1951); Illinois: City of Chicago v. Shayne, 46 II.
App. 2d 33, 196 N.E.2d 521 (1964); Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill. App. 2d 326, 188 N.E.2d 243
STUDY ALCOHOLIC BEvERAGE LAWS, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,

(1963); Indiana: State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 197 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1964);
Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Deets, 133 Ind. App. 444, 179 N.E.2d 217 (1962);
Kansas: State v. Mermis, 187 Kan. 611, 358 P.2d 936 (1961); Kentucky: Lexington R.B.D.

Ass'n v. Department of A.B.C. Bd., 303 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Montana: Light v.
Zeiter, 124 Mont. 67, 219 P.2d 295 (1950); Nebraska: State v. Lydick, 11 Neb. 366, 9 N.W.
560 (1881); New Jersey: Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 81 N.J. Super. 65, 194 A.2d 591 (1963);
279 Club, Inc. v. Municipal Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 73 N.J. Super. 15, 179 A.2d
155 (1962); Novak v. Krauz, 138 N.J. Eq. 241, 47 A.2d 586 (1946); Ohio: Stouffer Corp. v.

Board of Liquor Control, 165 Ohio St. 96, 133 N.E.2d 325 (1956) ; Abraham v. Fioramonte, 158
Ohio St. 213, 107 N.E.2d 321 (1952); Pennsylvania: In re Motta, 194 Pa. Super. 42, 166
A.2d 50 (1960); In re Tahiti Bar, Inc. 186 Pa. Super. 214, 142 A.2d 491 (1958); Tennessee: Safier v. Atkins, 199 Tenn. 574, 288 S.W.2d 441 (1956); McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn.
631, 188 S.W.2d 745 (1945); Texas: Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Raspante, 308 S.W.2d
136 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957); Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Super. Savings Stamp Co., 303
S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957); Washington: Arndt v. Manville, 53 Wash. 2d 305,
333 P.2d 667 (1958); Wyoming: Whitesides v. Council of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d
520 (1957); Vermont: Carousel Grill, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 123 Vt. 93, 182 A.2d 336

(1962).
3

137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890).
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the contrary, it is the writer's basic premise that the "privilege-property" dichotomy
built up around liquor license law should be abolished in favor of recognition of such
licenses as property, in the broadest sense of the word. At the outset, the term "prop'erty" must be given content as it is to be used in this note. "Property" may signify
either the subject matter in which certain rights exist, or it may signify valuable rights
and interests protected by law. The essential attributes of property include the rights
of acquisition, possession, use, enjoyment and
4 disposition. There can be no conception
of property apart from its control and use.
A. Liquor Licenses May Have the Qualities of Property
* Despite their basic approach that a liquor license represents a personal privilege
to do that which would otherwise be unlawful, courts have held in a wide variety of
situations that such licenses are "property," or that they at least partake of the
"qualities" of property.
. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana has taken the
position that while a liquor license may not itself be property, the use and enjoyment
of the license may vest in the holder something which is valuable and has all the
qualities of property. In Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates,5 the Court was faced with a
situation where an injunction was sought to keep the state from enforcing a legislative
provision which would cause a revocation of a beer-wholesaler's permit. The application for the injunction was denied, but the Court did note that:
While a permit or license as such may not be property, the use and
enjoyment of it may give to its possessor something that is valuable and
which has all the qualities of property .... [iThe use of such permit, if
not the permit itself, is property 6within the meaning of the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution.

It is also noteworthy that the Court chose to use such language despite the presence
of an Indiana statute specifically stating that holders of beer permits have no property
rights in their permits.7
A similar stand was taken in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion in the Indiana
Supreme Court." Here a permittee sought to enjoin the Alcoholic Beverage Commission from allowing package store dealers to sell cooled beer. The majority held
that no injunction would issue, relying on the familiar language that a permittee
has no property rights in his permit. The two dissenting judges (a 3-2 decision)
cited the above language in the Midwest Beverage Co.9 case, and argued that the
relationship between the holder's permit and his investment in property and equipment should be recognized. The dissenters found that the permittee had vested in
himself property rights in the ownership and operation of his business; and, certainly, the business could not lawfully function without a permit. Thus, the permittee had stated a cause of action falling within the purview of equity's injunctive power.
B. Property With Respect to the Rest of the World-Privilege With Respect to the
Issuing Authority
Some courts, in order to reach what they feel are desirable and just results
in liquor license cases, have made the following distinction: as between the holder
of a license and the issuing state, the license is a mere "privilege"; however, between
the holder and the rest of the world this same license is "property."' 0 This distinc4 73 C.J. Property § 1 (1951).
5

61 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945).

6 Id. at 691.

IND. ANN. STAT., § 12-443 (1956).
8 State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 197 N.E.2d 634, 641-46 (Ind. 1964)
(dissent).
9 Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates, 61 F. Supp, 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945).
10 See Jaffe v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 69 Wash. 308, 124 P. 1122 (1912). Accord,
Belle Isle v. Hempy, 23 Cal. Rptr. 599, 206 Cal. App. 2d 14 (1962); Valley Country Club v.
Mender, 64 N.M. 59, 323 P.2d 1099 (1958); Jones & Co. v. Parsons, 136 Colo. 434, 319 P.2d
480 (1957); Lane v. Hewgley, 155 S.W. 348 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1913).
7
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tion was the basis upon which the Supreme Court of Idaho recently rendered -its
decision in Weller v. Hooper." Here, in a mandamus proceeding to compel- the
allowance of a license transfer from a decedent's personal representative, the Court
held a statute unconstitutional. The statute in question forever barred a convicted
felon from obtaining a liquor license if he possessed a license at the time of his
conviction, whereas if he held no license at the time of his conviction, he might
again obtain a grant in five years. After noting Idaho authority12 to the effect
that a liquor license is a mere personal privilege, the Hooper Court stated%
The provisions of the two referred to sections of the statute connote that
a liquor license as between the licensee and third persons constitutes a right
to which value as property and assignability is attributed and, therefore, as
between the licensee and third persons such right 3upon death of the licensee
becomes assignable by the personal representative.'

In a 1964 case, the Supreme Court of Arizona, while upholding the validity of a
statute terminating the leasing of liquor licenses, noted that while a liquor license
as between the licensee and the state is a mere privilege- "as between the1 licensee
and third persons, a liquor license is a property right with unique value."'
C. Property for Purposes of Taxation
Another area in which liquor licenses have been magically turned into 'property" is the tax field. It has been recognized that such licenses are "property"
within the meaning of 'section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code.' 5 In Maryland recently the Director of Internal Revenue seized and sold the license of a
holder who was delinquent in the payment of his 'taxes. The Maryland Board
of Liquor License Commissioners, however, refused to transfer the license to the
purchaser on the grounds that since the license was not "property," the government
had no right to seize and sell it. The Board based its position primarily upon a
Maryland statute specifically holding that liquor licenses are not property' 6
However, the Maryland Court reversed, noting that the term "property" is to be
given a broad construction in tax law," and holding that 'the liquor license was
"property" within the meaning of section 6321. The Court -said that the license
had definite value and that it at least had the "attributes" of property. Thus,
while the license might not'be considered "property" for the purposes of the
applicable Maryland statute, it should be considered "property" for other purposes.' 8 This result may be contrasted with the much older case of Harding v.
Board of Equalization,9 where the Nebraska Supreme Court 'ruled that since a
liquor license was purely a privilege, it was not subject to assessment 'for purposes
of taxation under Nebraska law.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also determined that a liquor license
constitutes "property" within the meaning of section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code. This Court also was faced with the argument that a statute stating that
liquor licenses are not property meant that they were not subject to tax liens.O

85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792 (1963).
Nampa Lodge No. 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P.2d 991 (1961).
Weller v. Hooper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792, 797 (1963).
Hooper v. Duncan, 95 Ariz. 305, 389 P.2d 706, 708 (1964).
15 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person."
16 M. ANN. CODE, art. 2B, § 72 (1957).
17 Citizens State Bank of Barstow v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940).
18 Deitsch v. Board of Liquor License Commrs, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9496, 68,334, 68,335
11
12
13
14'

(Md. Cir. Ct. 1958).

19 90 Neb. 232, 133 N.W. 191 (1911).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 1-26 (1940).
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The Court ruled that state legislative pronouncements are not sufficient to determine
the existence or nonexistence of property under section 6321.21
The Court did note that while the state statute could not immunize a liquor
license from attachment to satisfy a federal tax lien, the vitality of the statute was
in no way diminished. The obvious import of the decision is that liquor licenses
are "property" and are subject to federal tax liens when a holder is deficient in
his tax payments; yet, the very same license holder may be far behind in his rent,
or have executed a chattel mortgage which cannot be paid, and his license, being
a mere "privilege" as to these creditors, will be beyond their reach. While section
6321 of the Internal Revenue Code compels a liberal construction of the term
"property," there is no good reason why liquor license should not also be "property"
as to the holder's landlord and his chattel mortgagee. While the New Jersey decision
appears fundamentally sound, its possible implications trouble one's sense of justice.
D. Property Such That Equity Will Recognize a Suit for Specific Performance of a
Contract to Convey
The right of a party to bring an equitable action for specific performance of a
contract to convey a liquor license has gained recognition. Here we have another
situation where a liquor license has the quality and value of property. In the case
of Horn Moon Jung v. Soo, 22 the Supreme Court of Arizona focused upon the
Arizona statute permitting the transfer of liquor licenses with the consent of the
appropriate commission, and held that specific performance was proper since a
liquor license was a "property" right.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rendered a similar decision in Cochrane
v. Szpakowski. 23 Here specific performance of a contract to sell a restaurant and
retail liquor business was sought. The Court decreed specific performance, noting
that while such a remedy would not ordinarily lie for breach of a contract since
damages are ascertainable, an exception exists for contracts dealing in commodities,
such as liquor licenses, which cannot readily be purchased in the open market. While
the Court did not openly state that liquor licenses are "property," this appears to
be a tacit assumption.
The Soo and Cochrane courts focused upon the factors of transferability and
limitation on the number of outstanding licenses as rendering peculiar value and
quality to liquor licenses. The Arizona Court, as previously stated, emphasized
the element of transferability, noting that this certainly adds value to a liquor license.
This consideration has frequently been cited by other courts when they hold that
a liquor license is "property," or at least has the "qualities of property." 2' Transfers of liquor licenses from one person to another are permitted in roughly25 twentyeight states. Transfer of a license from one premise to another is allowed in some
forty-one tates.26 This element of transferability in a majority of states does add
value to the license.
The Pennsylvania Court in Cochrane was impressed by the fact that since
the state limited the number of liquor licenses outstanding and there were many
21 Boss Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584, 586-87 (1963). Accord,
Golden v. State, 133 Cal. App. 2d 640, 285 P.2d 49 (1955).
22 64 Ariz. 216, 167 P.2d 929 (1946).
23 355 Pa. 357, 49 A.2d 692 (1946).
24 See Boss Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584 (1963); Belle'Isle
v. Hempy, 23 Cal. Rptr. 599, 20 Cal. App. 2d 14 (1962); Golden v. State, 133 Cal. App. 2d
640, 285 P.2d 49 (1955) ; In re Quaker Room, 90 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Horn
Moon Jung v. Soo, 64 Ariz. 216. 167 P.2d 929 (1946); Jaffe v. Pacific Brewing & Malting
Co., 69 Wash. 308. 124 Pac. 1122 (1912); Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41
Wash. 385, 83 P. 898 (1906) ; People v. Durante, 19 App. Div. 292, 45 N.Y. Supp. 1073 (1897).
25 The reference source for this and other figures is the data compiled by the Joint Committee of the States to Study Alcoholic Beverage Laws. These statistics are offered as generally illustrative rather than necessarily precise.

26

JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE STATES TO STUDY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS, ALCOHOLIC

BEVERAGE CONTROL,

117, Table 16 (1950).
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applicants for the available licenses, the license had a very peculiar value to the
prospective purchaser, a value so unique that it could not be measured by any
ordinary theory of damages. This limitation on the number of outstanding licenses
is fairly common. Thirty-three states either have direct numerical restrictions, or
vest discretion in the state or local authorities to set up such limitations.
E. Property for Purposes of Computation of Inheritance Tax
An interesting question came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a
proceeding to appraise a decedent liquor licensee's personal estate for inheritance tax
purposes. The Court overturned a case decided only eight years before, 28 and held that
the value of the statutory 29 right to apply for the transfer of a liquor license after
the death of the holder is subject to inclusion as part of the decedent's estate for
the purpose of computing inheritance tax. 30 The Court accepted the basic proposition that a liquor license is, per se, a personal privilege and not a property right.
It noted that a distinction could be made between the license itself and the statutory
right to apply for transfer of the license formerly held by the deceased. While the
license itself was not "property," the value of the right to apply for the license in
the name of the surviving spouse or a personal representative, and the consequent
power of sale and transfer, was "property" which enhanced the estate and was
subject to inheritance taxation under the applicable Pennsylvania statute.31 The
Court relied heavily upon the dissenting opinion of Justice Chidsey in the case of
In re Ryan's Estate.32 There this same distinction between the right of transfer
and the actual license was made.
The decision in the Pennsylvania case appears sound but the distinction made
is troublesome. The statutory right to apply for a transfer and the actual license
are perhaps two distinct things, but what is it that renders this right so valuable?
It is precisely the license itself, not the right to apply for a transfer, which is the
property. As in the federal income tax cases, the court is -forced into a conceptual
inconsistency of a kind which tends eventually to beget injustice.
F. Constitutional- Commercial Dichotomy
While a liquor license may not be "property" in a constitutional sense, it may
be "property" in a commercial sense. In a Florida case 3 decided last year a liquor
license, validly issued by the state and owned by a lessee of real property, was
subjected to a landlord's lien for rent and the lien of a chattel mortgag-2e. The
Court noted a Florida precedent that a liquor license is a mere personal' privilege
and is not property in a constitutional sense,34 but went on to 'hold that it was
nonetheless property in a commercial sense. Another Florida Supreme Court case
was utilized for its holding that due'to the numerical limitations placed upon license
issuance, such governmental grants had come to have the quality of property with
value far in excess of the license fees exacted.3 5
Thus, in Yarbrough v. Villeneuve"8 the Court emphasized again the factors
of transferability and limited issuance as giving quality and value to a license.

27 Id. at 98-99, Table 9.
28 In re Ryan's Estate, 375 Pa. 42, 99 A.2d 562 (1953).
29 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 47, § 4-468 (1952).
30 In re Feitz's Estate, 402 Pa. 437, 167 A.2d 504 (1961).
31 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2301 (1949).
32 In re Ryan's Estate, 375 Pa. 42, 99 A.2d 562, 564 (1953) (dissent).
33 Yarbrough v. Villeneuve, 160 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Accord, Hubbard
v. Jebb, 163 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
34 State v. Fuller, 136 Fla. 788, 187 So. 148 (1939).
35 House v. Cotton, 52 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1951).
36 160 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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Although on the point of law involved there is authority to the contrary,s 7 it appears
that the Villeneuve Court reached a just result.
Another in this line of cases recognizing a liquor license as property for commercial purposes is Rowe v. Colpoys.3 s Here the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a liquor license was subject to a levy under execution to satisfy a court judgment. The Court urged that the common law rule forbidding a levy upon licenses
should be confined to non-transferable licenses and argued that a liquor license was
a valuable right with the attributes of property. As such the Court. could find no
sound reason why this property right should be immunized from the same process
to which other property rights were subjected.39 Here the "commercial-constitutional" distinction was not explicitly made. However, its presence
is certainly
40
implicit as the case did recognize the Crowley v. Christensen doctrine.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Montana has held that a liquor license
is property and may be made subject to attachment. 41
The appellation "property" has also been applied to a liquor license to hold
that a trustee in bankruptcy might reach the proceeds realized from a transfer of
the license. In Fisher v. Cushman, 2 the First Circuit reached such a decision when
faced with a situation where a license holder, immediately before he went into
bankruptcy, transferred his license and personally realized the proceeds. The Court
cogently noted the impossibility of giving "any categorical definition to the word
'property,' . . ." and of attaching to it "in certain relations the limitations which
would be attached to it in others." 43 While the license was not itself property, the
Court felt that since it represented a substantial part of the bankrupt's capital investment which would otherwise be subject to the claims of his creditors, and since
it could be converted into money
at the holder's option, the license should not be
44
withheld from his creditors.
This reasoning is both sound and compelling, although somewhat confusing,
since the Court first says that the license is not property, and then turns right back
and says that which it represents is property. This distinction is tenuous and should
not be recognized. Why not simply call the license "property"?
In a like context the Supreme Court of Washington has enjoined a proposed
transfer and denominated a liquor license "property"
in order to permit a receiver
45
to realize its benefit for attaching creditors.
In all of these cases the message is basically the same. While there may be
precedent to the effect that a liquor license is not "property," it can be overcome
when it is expedient to do so by utilizing a "commercial" definition of property,
as opposed to a "constitutional" definition. This "constitutional-commercial" dichotomy has been used to attain sound results. But, if it is admitted that a liquor
license is a "commercial property right," then why should not such a right, as
lawfully conferred by the licensing process, be considered a vested right in the
constitutional sense?
G. Conclusion
The doctrine that liquor licenses are mere "privileges" stands contradicted by
a substantial body of law. Many courts have made a tentative step forward and
have gone so far as to state that a liquor license partakes of the "qualities" of
37 Allied Investment Credit Corp. v. Stardust Lounge, Inc., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 596, 192
N.E.2d 801 (1963).
38 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1943)', cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
39 Id. at 251.
40 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
41 Stallinger v. Goss, 121 Mont. 437, 193 P.2d 810 (1948).
42 103 F. 860 (1st Cir. 1900).
43 Id. at 864.
44 Id. at 865.
45 Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41 Wash. 385, 83 P. 898 (1906).
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property.46 Other courts have declared that a liquor license is property with peculiar
and special value.47 The language utilized is typically unequivocal: "There is no
question
that the lawful possession of a liquor license invests one with a property
48
right."

Liquor licenses have been recognized as "property" in a large variety of situations:
A. While a person may not have a vested property right in a liquor license
itself, he does have such a right in the use and enjoyment of the license while it is
in effect.
B. As between the holder of a liquor license and the issuing authority, the
license is a mere privilege: but, the same license, as between its holder and the rest
of the world represents property.
C. A liquor license constitutes property within the meaning of section 6321 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
D. A party may bring an equitable action for specific performance of a contract to convey a liquor license since the license qualifies as property.
E. The value of a statutory right to apply for transfer of a liquor license at
the death of its holder is property and, as such, is subject to inclusion as part of
the decedent's estate.
F. While a particular liquor license may not be property in a constitutional
sense, the same license may be property in a commercial sense. While the cited
cases have probably achieved substantial justice, nevertheless the perpetuation of
this "property-privilege" dichotomy renders litigation a free-wheeling, guessing
game. Thus, a statute describing a liquor license as a privilege is not necessarily
dispositive. 49 This conceptual ambidexterity may permit courts and boards summarily to revoke liquor licenses without due process. This problem will be dealt
with at length in the next section of this note.
Consider a liquor license in terms of the definition of "property" previously
formulated. 50 The essential elements of property include the rights of acquisition,
possession, use, enjoyment, and disposition. Local governmental bodies and states
have a wide latitude in enacting reasonable standards to determine who shall
acquire licenses. But, the licensing authority does not have an uncontrolled discretion in doling out licenses, and, so long as a person can measure up to the prescribed standards and there are licenses available, he may not be arbitrarily refused.
There is a "qualified right" of acquisition in the law of liquor licensing.51 In most
states it is recognized that the holder of a liquor license has a right of possession
invariably for one year,52 which may not be arbitrarily taken away. Given that
the applicant is licensed, he also has the right of use and enjoyment of his license
subject, of course, to the regulatory powers of the governing authorities. Here it
might be argued that the essence of property is freedom from regulation. But this
argument seems fallacious in the light of our practical experience. An owner certainly has a "property right" in his automobile for which he has paid the required
46 See Boss Co., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584 (1963); Kline v.
State Beverage Dept., 77 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1955); House v. Cotton, 52 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
1951); Burton v. Lefebvre, 72 R.I. 478, 53 A.2d 456 (1947).
47 Siler v. Superior Ct., 83 Ariz. 49, 316 P.2d 2'96 (1957); Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz.
328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952); Stallinger v. Goss, 121 Mont, 437, 193 P.2d 810 (1948); Horn
Moon Jung v. Soo, 64 Ariz. 216, 167 P.2d 929 (1946); Toyos v. ,Bruckman, 266 App. Div.
28, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Appeal of Cordano, 91 Conn. 718, 101 Atl. 85 (1917);
Jaffe v. Pacific Brewing & Malting,-Co., 69 Wash. 308, 124 P. 1122 (1912); Deggender v.
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41 Wash. 385, 83 P. 898 (1906).
48 People v. Stein, 236 N.Y.S. 2d 703, 704 (Westchester County Ct. 1962).
49 Deitsch v. Board of Liquor License Comm'rs, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9496, 68,334 (Md.
Cir. Ct. 1958).
50 See text accompanying footnote.4.
51 See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, aff'd on rehearing, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
52 See JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE STATES TO STUDy ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAws, ALCOHoLIc BEvERAoE CONTROL, 118, Table 17 (1950).
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sum. Yet, he is subjected'to very extensive regulation in the use of this property,
and he may even see a constructive revocation of his property by the authorities
through the removal of his license. And, finally, in some forty states, as was previously noted, a qualified right of disposition is recognized. Thus, within this
general definition of "property," it is submitted that a liquor license does qualify
as such.
The reluctance of some state courts to recognize a liquor license as property
is somewhat baffling. Perhaps it is simply a refusal to recognize a constitutional
right in an industry which bears the scars of the Prohibition Era and is classified
by many as an "evil" business. There are no well-reasoned opinions stating precisely
why a liquor license should be a mere "privilege."
III. The Privilege-Property Dichotomy: A Basis for a Procedural Injustice.
A. Introduction
This section of the note is concerned with the following question: Does the
Constitution entitle a holder of a liquor license to notice and hearing before his
license is revoked? There is a large body of decisional law to the effect that statutes
and municipal ordinances providing for summary revocation, without notice and
hearing, are not unconstitutional. 53 The courts reason that one who obtains a
license authorizing participation in what would otherwise be an unlawful business
takes this personal privilege subject to all its infirmities, including the possibility
that it might be summarily revoked if the governing statutes so provide. Today
most states have statutes requiring notice and hearing on the part of the administrative body handling license revocations,54 and it is possible that the rules of law laid
down by some of the cases cited above have been altered by these statutes. However,
no court has specifically overruled any of these decisions and,- to the extent that
they represent the existing law in their respective jurisdictions, exception is taken
to the proposition of law for which they stand.
Consider the Iowa case of Walker v. City of Clinton.5 5 Here a licensee had his
beer permit revoked by a town council for alleged sales to minors. The council
acted upon its own motion without notice or hearing. The evidence against the
permittee consisted of written statements of two minors and oral, unsworn testimony
of a council member and the chief of police. Despite this slim evidence, and the
fact that the license holder had no opportunity to be heard or to cross-examine, the
Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the revocation, noting that had the council acted
under a statute relating to complaints filed by citizens or police officers notice and
hearing might have been required. However, since the council acted on its own
motion, summary revocation was permissible. The reasoning employed by the
Court was that outlined in the preceding paragraph: all that the permittee had was
53 California: Saso v. Furtado, 104 Cal. App. 2d 759, 232 P.2d 583 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951); State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. App. 2d 374, 42 P.2d 1076 (1935);
Connecticut: Beckanstein v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 140 Conn. 185, 99 A.2d 119 (1953);
Delaware: Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941); Florida:
Holloway v. Schott, 64 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1953); Georgia: Lewis v. City of Smyrna, 214 Ga.
323, 104 S.E.2d 571 (1958); Richmond County v. Glanton, 209 Ga. 733, 76 S.E.2d 65
(1953); Crummey v. State, 83 Ga. App. 459, 64 S.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1951); Highnote v.
Jones, 198 Ga. 56, 31 S.E.2d 13 (1944); Sprayberry v. City of Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120, 13 S.E.
197 (1891); Illinois: Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 412 Ill. 365, 106 N.E.2d
354 (1952); Iowa: Michael v. Town of Logan, 274 Iowa 574, 73 N.W.2d 714 (1955);
Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953); McConkie v. Remley, 119
Iowa 512, 93 N.W. 505 (1903); Minnesota: Abeln v. City of Shakopee, 224 Minn. 262, 28
N.W.2d 642 (1947); Missouri: Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 334 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.
1960); Nebraska: Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371, 36 N.W. 554 (1888), aff'd on rehearing, 27
Neb. 325, 43 N.W. 108 (1889); Nevada: Wallace v. Mayor of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528
(1903); New Mexico: Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 225 (1940).
54 The only states in which such requirements are not specifically enumerated are Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and Utah.
55 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
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a "privilege," and this he took subject to the possibility of summary revocation. 58
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in his treatise on administrative law, refers
to this Walker case as "a clear case of procedural injustice." 57 Davis directly attacks
the "privilege doctrine" and soundly reasons that once a liquor license has been
issued, the licensee's business is in fact lawful, and, after he has invested time and
money, in his operation, he should be accorded fair treatment. The logic of this
reasoning is compelling and does comport with one's fundamental sense of justice.
To permit local officials summarily to pronounce a death sentence upon a person's
lawful livelihood requires a better reason.
Professor Gellhorn5s suggests that the assignment of license occupations to the
"privilege" category is based to a great extent on the relative undesirability of the
particular activity in question. Those occupations which are not traditionally regarded as "respectable" may be carried on only by the permission of the authorities,
and they are not to be accorded the same constitutional protection as the more
dignified professions. Gellhorn, like Professor Davis, feels that the "privilegeproperty" dichotomy has no place in the field of licensing. He argues:
It is only by an act of faith ... that one reaches the conclusion that a
quack doctor or shyster lawyer has less opportunity "for the infliction of
general and substantial injury" to the public than has, let us say, the proprietor of a tavern; or that the latter'does not serve a purpose which potentially is socially
as useful as that of the insurance broker or the manufacturer
of near beer.59

The conflicting interests in the area of license revocation must be recognized.
The need for protection of the public when a licensee violates the regulations
attendant to his business cannot be disputed. Yet, the right of a person to engage
in his lawful occupation must also be weighed in the balance. There is the everpresent danger of corruption, favoritism and patronage by local administrative
officials. Where summary revocation is allowed, even an honest mistake may spell
ruination for the former licensee. An additional consideration, and it is one of
the primary arguments advanced in defense of the administrative process, is the
speed with which the administrative machinery is to work. The writer has trouble
conceiving of a situation so gross that immediate revocation is necessary, rather
than providing the license holder with a few days' notice and a hearing. These
considerations, plus the arguments advanced by Professors Davis and Gellhorn,
lead to the conclusion that summary revocation of a liquor license ought never
be countenanced. The license should be recognized as "property" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment such that it may not be removed by the states
without due process of law.
As already noted, the great majority of the states today do have statutes
requiring notice and hearing before a commission or governmental authority may
revoke a liquor license. Many of the cases allowing summary revocation on the
basis of the "privilege-doctrine" are old, 60 while several of the statutes incorporating
due process requirements into the liquor license revocation are relatively new. 1
It could be argued by inference from these facts that there is a trend on the part
of state legislatures to recognize liquor licenses as "property" in a constitutional
sense. Where a statute expressly requires notice and hearing before revocation,
compliance with these prerequisites is essential to the validity of the administrative

56 The decision in this case might be different under IowA
1964).
57 DAVrS, ADmiNisTRATIvE LAw, 140 (1959).
58

GELLnORN,

ADmINISTRATIVE

LAW,

COD- ANN., § 123.32 (Supp.

273-283 (2d ed. 1947).

59 Id. at 277.
60 Cases cited note 53 supra.
61 The Iowa statute cited at note 56 supra is an example.
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action.6" Yet, as the Walker case illustrates, such statutes are sometimes circumvented
with the aid of the "privilege doctrine."
B. Judicial Displeasure With Summary Revocation
It is fair to say that many courts have evinced their displeasure with the summary revocation of liquor licenses. It has been held that where a statute requires
a hearing prior to revocation; a license may not be summarily revoked even though
it was originally unlawfully issued. In Zimmerman v. Mulrooney,63 an applicant
paid the prescribed sum, obtained a license and equipped her liquor store at considerable expense. Eighteen days later the authorities repossessed the license claiming that it had been issued through error and inadvertence. The court held that
no summary power had been given to revoke such licenses even though unlawfully
or erroneously issued: "Before the plaintiff can be deprived of her money, property,
and rights, she is entitled to 64be heard before some tribunal concerning the validity
of the license issued to her."
Other courts have attempted to reach just results by reading a hearing requirement into statutory language permitting revocation "for cause," or where the statute
is wholly silent on the question. In the case of Burton v. Lefebvre,65 the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island was faced with a statute limiting the power of local licensing
boards to revocations "for cause." The Court held that even if a statute did not
specifically require a hearing, such a requirement might be implied when the
revocation of a lawfully issued license was at stake. It was argued that the revocation powers of the board were not merely administrative, but rather judicial or
quasi-judicial, and the Court fell back upon an "aspects of property" argument
saying that, "[the] holder of such a license should have
protection from [the] arbi'66
trary interference . .. [of] the local licensing board.
The Supreme Court of California has rendered a similar opinion under a
statute allowing revocation for "good cause," 67 and the Court of Appeals of New
York, dealing with the revocation of a taxi driver's license without notice or hearing,
has noted that: "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property
rights - as it does in the present case - the courts'have implied the requirement
of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent ...
."618 While this case does
arise in a different context, the analogy between a cab driver's license and a liquor
license appears strong. It is also noteworthy that the New York court focused upon
the fact that a revocation proceeding involves fact-finding, a determination of rights
and liabilities based upon this fact-finding, and, thus, must be considered a judicial
act.
Some courts have even gone so far as to argue that it really does not matter
whether we call a liquor license "property" or "privilege." Due process should be
accorded in any case. 69
While these cases do not hold that a liquor license is "property" - and, thus,
do not support the basic contention of this note- they do contradict the idea
62 See Strauss v. Berkshire, 132 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1943); Meinwald v. Doran, 60 F.2d
261 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); Long & Co. v. Campbell, 28 F.2d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aff'd, 281
U.S. 610 (1930); Feil Brewing Co. v. Blair, 2 F.2d 879 (E.D. Pa. 1924); Piona v. Alcoholic
Beverage Comm'n, 332 Mass. 53, 123 N.E.2d 390 (1954).
63 241 App. Div. 695, 269 N.Y.S. 602 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
64 Zimmerman v. Mulrooney, supra note 63 at 603 (Emphasis added).
65 72 R.I. 478, 53 A.2d 456 (1947).
66 Burton v. Lefebvre, supra note 46, at 460.
67 Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1946).
68 Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 468, 121 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1954).
69 Irvine v. State Bd. of Equalization, 40 Cal. App. 2d 280, 104 P.2d 847, 850 (1940):
"under the American system of justice it is the policy of our law that a person should not be
deprived even of a 'permit' to engage in a legitimate business without a fair and impartial
hearing and without an opportunity to present competent evidence for consideration by the
licensing authority in opposition to the proposed revocation of his permit." Accord, Glicker
v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96, 100 (6th Cir. 1947).
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that summary revocation is allowable when the court is dealing with a mere
"privilege."
C. A Guidepost
A 1964 decision may, hopefully, serve as a guidepost to the state courts.
Although the Fifth Circuit, in Hornsby v. Allen'70 was dealing with a license
application rather than a revocation case, the Court stated principles which are
applicable in either area. Here the unsuccessful applicant for a liquor license
alleged that she had met all of the statutory requirements and claimed that the
denial of her application represented a deprivation of her civil rights. The Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff had stated a good cause of action. The Court
observed that licensing is an adjudicative process. "Merely calling a liquor license
a privilege does not free the municipal 'authorities from the due process requirements in licensing and allow them to exercise an uncontrolled discretion."71 The
Court then went on to argue:
The potential social undesirability of the product may warrant absolutely
prohibiting it, or, as the Aldermanic Board has done to some extent here,
imposing restrictions to protect the community from its harmful influences.
But the dangers do not justify depriving those who deal in liquor, or seek
to deal in it, of the customary constitutional safeguards. Indeed, the great
social interest in the liquor industry makes an exceptionally strong case for
adherence to proper72 procedures and access to judicial review in licensing the
retail sale of liquor.

8
The Court, citing Glicker v. Liquor Control Comn'n,7
stated that it saw no valid
distinction between the revocation of the license involved in the Glicker case and
the denial of the license application involved in the Hornsby case.
This reasoning is sound and persuasive. Although the Fifth Circuit seems to
say that it does not matter whether or not the license is called a "privilege," it is
submitted that there is certainly an implicit recognition of the liquor license as
"property." The applicant may not be deprived of or denied the license without
the process which is her due. Further, if the beneficial results of the Hornsby doctrine are to be fully realized, there must be an explicit recognition of liquor licenses
as "property."

D. Recognition of Property Right in Lawful Continuation of Business
In another recent case, the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Michigan advanced a proposition which ties in closely with the Hornsby doctrine.
In Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids'74 the chief of police and city commission of
Grand Rapids had denied a transfer and ultimately revoked the only class-C liquor
license own'ed and operated by a-Negro in the city. The Court found racial discrimination and voided the denial of transfer and the revocation. Significantly,
the Court argued: "Liberty includes the right to pursue a lawful occupation. To
prevent this without due process
is to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
75
United States Constitution."'
In other occupational areas it has been similarly recognized that a person has
a "property right" in the continuation of a lawful business. In a 1961 decision
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that: "A license to engage in business
or practice a profession is a property right that cannot be taken away without due
process of law. The granting of such license is a right conferred by an administrative
act, but the deprivation of the right is a judicial act requiring due process .... ,,76
The license involved in this decision was a bondsman's license. But the language
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

326 F.2d 605, aff'd on rehearing, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
Hornsby v. Allen, supra note 78, at 609.
Id. at 609.
Glicker v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947).
222 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, supra note 74, at 386.
State v. Parrish, 254 N.C. 301, 118 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1961) (Emphasis added).
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quoted above does not seem limited in its application. Here the words of Professor
Gellhorn seem quite appropriate. For it is only by an act of faith that we can
arbitrarily determine that a bad doctor or a shyster lawyer, or a bad bondsman,
would have less opportunity for the infliction of substantial injury to the public
than would the proprietor of a tavern." In a case involving another bondsman's
license, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also focused upon the
fact that it was dealing with a revocation situation rather than the denial of a license
application, and stated: "But, once granted, the license becomes a right, and due
process of law must be followed to achieve deprivation. This is true even though
the license is a severely qualified one. .... ,78 This same Court of Appeals, when
faced with a case involving a refusal to renew an insurer's certificate to operate,
rendered a like opinion. The Court held that once a business has been established
on the basis of a license, "property rights" attach, and7 9the license may not be
revoked, nor renewal denied, without due process of law.
The New York Court of Appeals dealt with the summary revocation of a taxi
driver's license in Hecht v. Monaghan.80 But again, by analogy, the reasoning of
the Court is valuable in consideration of the nature of liquor licenses. The police
commissioner's order of revocation was reversed as the court noted that "a person
has a property right in the continuation of his business ....
Similar decisions have been rendered with respect to licenses authorizing
operation as a pawnbroker,8 2 and engaging in the practice of dentistry.83 No good
reason commends itself for distinguishing liquor licenses.
E. Procedural IrregularitiesDenounced in Revocation Proceedings
There is a substantial line of cases which support the proposition that the holder
of a liquor license is entitled to due process before his license is revoked, and nothing
less will do. Thus, procedural irregularities will not be countenanced in revocation
or suspension proceedings. It has been held that where a provision required a
hearing officer, the State Board of Equalization exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending a liquor license without such an officer present at a rehearing, even though
the original hearing had been held before a hearing officer.8 4 Similarly, a suspension for sales to minors was annulled where the licensee's attorney was unduly
restricted on cross-examination, despite what the court termed "clear evidence"
sustaining the suspension. 5 An Ohio Court of Appeals has overturned the revocation of a license where the permittee was denied the right to have certain witnesses
testify3 6 Again, revocation of a license and forfeiture of a bond were reversed
when a judge proceeded ex parte without providing notice to the licensee, although
notice and a hearing were provided to the surety on the licensee's bond. 7 The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that notice of determination to suspend a license
for sale to minors did not meet minimum standards of due process when the names
88
of the minors were not included in the commission's written determination.
Finally, it has been held that a charge that a liquor permittee failed to carry on
a club solely in the interest of dues-paying members was so general that it failed
to give adequate notice as per due process requirements.8 9
77 GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 277 (2d ed. 1947).
78 In re Carter, 177 F.2d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949).
79 Jordan v. United Ins. Co. of America, 289 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
80 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
81 Hecht v. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 424 (Emphasis added).
82 Wacksman v. Harrell, 174 Ohio St. 338, 189 N.E.2d 146 (1963).
83 Bruce v. Department of Registration, 26 Ill.2d 612, 187 N.E.2d 711 (1963).
84 Moyer v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Cal. App. 2d 651, 295 P.2d 583 (1956).
85 Maniccia v. State Liquor Authority, 3 App. Div. 2d 798, 160 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1957).
86 Codosky v. Department of Liquor Control, 74 Ohio S. Abs. 150, 139 N.E.2d 690 (1956).
87 De Lucca's Liquor License Case, 125 Pa. Super. 500, 190 At. 195 (1937).
88 Nelson v. Hopper, 86 Idaho 115, 383 P.2d 588 (1963).
89 American Veterans v. Board of Liquor Control, 93 Ohio S. Abs. 125, 193 N.E.2d 398
(1963).
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These cases clearly stand for the proposition that a liquor licensee is entitled
to due process, and nothing less, before his license may be either suspended or
revoked. This line of authority stands directly opposed to the idea that a liquor
license is a "mere privilege" which may be revoked or suspended at the whim or
caprice of the issuing authorities. It is submitted that these cases come much closer
to obtaining substantial justice than those cases decided mechanically on the basis
of the "privilege-property" dichotomy.
F. Suspension Proceedings As Compared to Revocation Proceedings
On occasion a distinction has been made between the process that is due when
it is suspension at stake, and the process due when revocation is attempted. For
example, the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld a fifteen-day suspension of a
liquor license when the only hearing accorded the holder was an informal one
in which no witnesses were sworn and no formal testimony taken. The Court
noted that the only statutory direction for a hearing was with regard to revocation
cases. 90 Professor Gellhorn advocates this distinction as a scheme which would
both protect the public and the license holder by permitting summary suspension.
yet making hearings mandatory before revocation. 91 This suggestion is somewhat
appealing, but still objectionable where suspension for a long time is possible.
After all, it should not be forgotten that the administrative process involved should
never be all that cumbersome or time-consuming.
G. Recognition of Continuing Interest in Liquor License
Most courts seem to take the position that there is no continuing interest in
a liquor license. That is, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary,
the former holder of a license has no rights different from those of any other person
when applying for renewal of his license, and, upon expiration, the holder is not
entitled to renewal as a matter of right. 92 However, at least one federal court 3
and a number of Pennsylvania courts94 take the position that the discretion of

an administrator should not be as broad in refusing renewal of a license as it is
in passing upon the original application and, by implication, that there is a continuing right in a liquor license. Preference for a holder over an applicant would
seem just in the light of the substantial investment which the holder has made.
Concededly, a limitation on the number of licenses issued may create a monopoly,
but all licensing systems create monopolies to a greater or lesser extent. In the
Doran v. United States case, while the Court did uphold the administrator's refusal
to renew, it noted that the brewery's holding a permit for many years was of "much
significance." The Court stated that "property rights" had grown up under the
90 Green Mountain Post v. Liquor Control Bd., 117 Vt. 405, 94 A.2d 230 (1953).
91 Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 85, at 279.
92 See U.S.: Bordenelli v. U.S., 233 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Quitt v. Stone, 39 F.2d 219
(D. Md. 1930), aff'd 46 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 839 (1931); Connecticut:Dadiskos v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 150 Conn. 422, 190 A.2d 490 (1963); Colorado: City of Manitou Springs v. Walk, 149 Colo. 43, 367 P.2d 744 (1961); MacArthur v.
Martelli, 127 Colo. 308, 255 P.2d 969 (1953); Board of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 121
Colo. 108, 213 P.2d 608 (1949); Florida: City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp.,
129 So. 2d 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Leafer v. State, 104 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1958); Illinois: Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill. App.2d 326, 188 N.E.2d 243 (1963); Kansas: In re Murphy's
Appeal, 184 Kan. 291, 336 P.2d 411 (1959); Massachusetts: Piona v. Selectmen of Canton,
333 Mass. 503, 131 N.E.2d 766 (1956); Liggett Drug Co. v. Board of License Comm'rs, 296
Mass. 41, 4 N.E.2d 628 (1936) ; Minnesota: Paron v. City of Shakopee, 226 Minn. 222, 32 N.W.
2d 603 (1948); New Jersey: 279 Club, Inc. v. Municipal Bd. of Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 15, 179
A.2d 155 (1962); Zicherman v. Driscoll, 133 N.J.L. 586, 45 A.2d 620 (1946); New York:
Berkowitz v. Rohan, 21 Misc. 2d 922, 193 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1959).
93 Kaer Co. v. Doran, 42 F.2d 923 (E.D.Pa. 1930).
94 Pennsylvania Distilling Co. v. Pennsylvania Alcoholic Permit Bd., 20 Pa. D. & C. 385
(1933); Erie Licenses, 4 Pa. Dist. 167 (1895); Helling's License, 2 Pa. County Ct. 76 (1886);
In re Justin, 2 Pa. County Ct. 22 (1886); License of Schantz, 1 Pa. County Ct. 361 (1886);
O'Brien's License, 1 Pa. County Ct. 363 (1886).
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granted permit and the value of the holder's investment should, not be destroyed
unless his conduct clearly warranted forfeiture of the license.95
While the above cases could not be called a powerful body of precedent, they
are correctly decided, and therefore must be respected.
H. Conclusion
Despite the substantial precedent to the effect that statutes and ordinances
providing for summary revocation of a liquor license are not unconstitutional,
there is a great deal of authority, both statutory and judicial, which suggests that
courts and legislatures have at least implicitly recognized that liquor licenses are
"property" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Today the vast
majority of the states do have statutes requiring notice and hearing before revocation. To this extent it might be said that the arguments advanced here simply
amount to "whipping a dead horse," and that really there is no need to attach the
appellation "property" to liquor licenses, since the courts are adequately protecting
the rights of holders. However, the devious tactics utilized by the Iowa court in
Walker v. City of Clinton,96 suggests that so long as the "property-privilege" dichotomy is viable, it may serve as a springboard for summary revocation and a basis
for circumventing notice and hearing requirements.
In the light of the Hornsby97 and Lewis98 cases, decided in 1964 and 1963
respectively, it would appear that there is a trend toward the recognition of liquor
licenses as property within the constitutional sense of the term. It is submitted
that there are no sound reasons why liquor licenses should not be recognized as
property and that such recognition should no longer be withheld.
James J. Leonard, Jr.

95 Kaier Co. v. Doran, 42 F.2d 923, 924 (E.D.Pa. 1930).
96 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
97 Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, aff'd on rehearing, 330 F.2d 55 (1964).
98 Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349 (W.D.Mich. 1963).

